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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to critique the individualistic ontological
premises of ‘self-directed learning’, as it has been developed in huma-
nist education literature in the tradition of Carl Rogers. The authors
suggest instead that social-transformative education and its critical
social ontology serve the emancipatory promise of education better
while offering the possibility to tackle the collective challenges of our
time. Beginning with an analysis of Rogers’ concepts of Self,
Knowledge and Society, the authors aim to show that self-directed
learning fails to live up to its emancipatory promise. Instead, the paper
picks up and develops on a debate in the early SDL literature between
Rogers and Paulo Freire, suggesting that Freire’s ontological premises
are incompatible with those of Rogers, yet better prepare students to
identify and face social problems. The authors further develop this
point through the cultural-historical analysis of speech of Lev
Vygotsky, cementing a social understanding of the Self as the founda-
tion of social-transformative education. The paper concludes on the
implications of this analysis for educational practice.
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Introduction
According to Guglielmino (2013) ‘preparation for self-directed learning (SDL) is essen-
tial in twenty-first-century educational institutions’ – a sentiment seemingly widely
shared in the field of higher education. From Harvard University in the US (Dutchen,
2013) to the prestigious Oxbridge institutions in the UK (University of Cambridge,
2018; University of Oxford, 2018), the biggest names in higher education are enjoining
their students to become self-directed learners. This call for self-direction in learning
echoes through so many university mission statements that it is impossible to list them
all, it is widely cited in the publications of education service providers and ministries of
education from Singapore (Ministry of Education, Singapore, 2015) to the USA (U.S.
Department of Education, 2018), and international institutions such as the EU
(European Commission, 2013) and UNESCO (UNESCO, 2016). The aspiration for self-
directed learning seems omnipresent in education parlance, buoyed by a wide range of
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academic literature – a search for the key term ‘self-directed learning’ in Google Scholar
yields nearly 90,000 results – though this does not imply that such popularity in
discourse translates into omnipresence in practice. Nevertheless, the fact that it is
being touted as essential for the future and so widely aspired to is sufficient justification
for investigating its origins, assumptions and implications.
The term ‘self-directed learning’ emerged in the 1970s, steeped in humanistic
education principles and principally following the works of American educators
Knowles (1975), Houle (1961) and Tough (1971). Concretely, the basis of Knowles’
popular method was a ‘learning contract’ – an agreement made between the teacher and
the student on the student’s personal (and unspecified) learning goals, and the metrics
by which the teacher and the student could agree that the objectives have been achieved
and thus obtain a grade. The students then did their work, and their achievements at
the end of the work period were measured against their contract to award the appro-
priate grade.
The 1980s were a seminal moment for SDL, as a critique of its ontological premises
(Geller, 1982) made way for empirical and practice-oriented research (Caffarella &
O’Donnell, 1987) that broadened its scope far beyond the method advocated by
Knowles and took on the meaning of any project conducted independently by adult
learners. The popularity of SDL as a concept for education practice and research took
flight during the 1990s and early 2000s, often coupled with ‘lifelong-learning’ (Candy,
1991) and ‘problem-based learning’ (Barrows, 1983; Blumberg, 2000). At this point,
SDL had little to do with a specific pedagogical method and more to do with the belief
that individual students should be responsible for finding their own learning resources,
managing their learning time, and developing their own learning objectives. From the
1990s onwards, SDL was touted as a sound life-long ‘learning to learn’ strategy for
students to hone their ability to meet to future (and yet unknown) employer demands
in a competitive job market (Boyatzis, 1999; Gerber, Lankshear, Larsson, & Svensson,
1995), but its underlying assumptions were no longer investigated or debated. Yet as
higher education’s focus on the individual student as a proto-worker has increased, we
question the ability of self-directed learning to prepare students for the collective
challenges that are taking centre stage in the twenty-first century. Humanity finds itself
in the eye of a perfect storm of crises: a sharp increase economic inequality (Oxfam,
2019); political upheavals and threats to progressive democracy; impending climate
catastrophe (IPCC, 2018)… the list goes on. The common denominator between these
issues is a global social dimension that calls for collective action. We submit and will
justify in this paper that higher educational methods focused exclusively on individual
learners are failing to provide students with the means to analyse the social components
of collective problems, to help students to understand their place in collective issues,
and to empower them to act upon societal problems.
Given these challenges, the aim of this paper is to examine the ontological and
epistemological assumptions that underlie ‘self-directed learning’, with a view to expos-
ing its fundamentally individualistic views of Self and Learning and challenging its
ability to meet our present educational needs. We want to suggest that the individua-
listic rationale implied in SDL is unable to adequately prepare students to address
societal challenges, and an alternative rationale for higher education is urgently needed.
We will, therefore, introduce the concept of social-transformative education to
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supersede SDL. To draw the contours of social-transformative education, we will
propose a re-evaluation of both Self and Learning in light of Freire’s Dialogical
Theory of Action and Vygotsky’s Cultural History perspective, thus building upon
existing critiques of SDL in the literature (Geller, 1982; O’Hara, 1989), while providing
a stronger case for a critical educational approach than has been done before.
Borrowing from these theories, we hope to bring to light the social nature of Self,
Knowledge and Learning, and close our analysis by expanding on why social-
transformative education will leave students better equipped to deal with our current
and future societal needs than SDL.
The phenomenal self in Rogers’ ‘self-directed learning’
In this section, we deconstruct the philosophical assumptions about Self and Knowledge
that underpin SDL using the theories of Rogers as a starting point for the analysis.
Although the term ‘self-directed learning’ was made famous by Knowles, his ideas can be
directly traced back to the humanistic psychology of Carl Rogers and his colleagues from the
University of Chicago starting in the 1940s (Brockett & Donaghy, 2005; Knowles, 1989).
Rogers was an American psychologist, psychotherapist and educationist who developed
psychotherapeutic principles premised on the notion that humans are endowed with an
unlimited potential for good, waiting to be unleashed. For Rogers, Man was defined and
differentiated from other animals by his potential for self-actualization, a term borrowed
from his colleague Abraham Maslow (Maslow, 1943). An ‘actualized’, or ‘fully-functioning’
person was someone living congruently with his ‘true’ self through an organismic valuing
process. This curious vernacular denoted a criticism of the unhealthy valuing processes of
adults, their ‘natural’ valuing process having been tampered with during childhood by the
disapproving words and conditional regard of parents and peers. Congruency could only be
restored when persons divorced self-perception from early social trauma and aligned instead
their concept of Self with the values transmitted by this ill-defined ‘core’ or ‘organism’ in every
moment, as they arose. Yet Rogers was starkly unspecific as to what this core might be,
ontologically speaking. This commitment to self-actualization formed the foundation on
which ‘self-directed learning’ was built in Rogerian education theory. Rogers first attempted
to codify his educational ideas in Client-centred Therapy (1951/2003), but his chief work on
education was published in 1969 under the title Freedom to Learn, in which he detailed the
need for and means to achieving self-directed learning. By his own admission, these ideas
were inspired by existentialism; in particular, the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard and the
psychology of Viktor Frankl (Rogers, 1969). He was impressed by Kierkegaard’s notion that
truth is contingent on personal meaning-making, and Frankl’s proposition that the search for
meaning drives Man. In analysing Rogers’ conception of the Self, it is worth keeping in mind
the existentialist antecedents of his thinking.
There are three inter-related philosophical assumptions underlying Rogers’ work,
namely about the Self, Knowledge and Society, that all shape SDL. We shall expound
each one in turn before exposing the consequent meaning of Rogerian SDL
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The self according to Rogers
Rogers never meaningfully explored the ontological implications of his idealistic, almost
naturalistic notion of the Self, and yet upon these assumptions rests the credibility of his
theory of learning – we must, therefore, explore them for him. The Self was for Rogers
a conceptual pattern of perceptions, characteristics and relationships existing in
a phenomenal field to which values could be ascribed by a core ‘organism’ – which is
the ‘true Self’ with which the Self must actualise if the person is to be fully functioning.
The field is phenomenal because it is limited by the range of a person’s experience of
the world, which determines the extent of that person’s reality.
But what is this organism? Even though Rogers heavily hinted that the organism is a pre-
conscious, possibly even physical entity, it makes no sense to consider that this is merely the
physical body, to which the mind should submit. This would negate free choice and render
the mind a slave to the physical needs and wants of the body, a position that leaves us little
better off than animals, and is wholly inconsistent with Rogers’ claim that Man is free.
Geller (Geller, 1982, p. 59) posited instead that Rogers starts with ‘the erroneous if not
incoherent assumption that the true self is an immaterial, unchanging thing-like substance
that can be an object of exploration and discovery but not a subject or agent’.
If the organism is a thing-like substance, then it cannot be a non-positional entity
devoid of identity, as the existentialist Sartre would describe it. Indeed, whereas Sartre
presented the Self as ‘empty’ (Sartre, 1943) and ontologically separate from things that
are ‘in-themselves’ including the human body, the organism posited by Rogers has
qualities with which the person’s concept of Self should seek to align. This is deeply
problematic in that in order to make sense of his claim that all humans are naturally
good, Rogers must assume that this core towards which the Self actualises is pre-social
(otherwise it would not be a priori good). It is against this pre-social notion of the true
Self that we shall argue in the second part of this paper.
Figure 1. Conceptual representation of Rogers’ theory of the Self.
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Impact of Rogers’ theory of self on knowledge
If reality is limited by the phenomenal field, as supposed by Rogers, it follows that
‘truth’ is also thereby constrained – a fact can only become a fact to the learner when it
penetrates the phenomenal field through the transformational process of experience
(Figure 1). Social reality being, according to humanists, the sum of individual phenom-
enal fields, constrained by the irreconcilable experiences of separate persons, it is in
every moment fluid and unpredictable. In the context of Rogerian reality’s kaleido-
scopic morphing act, factual knowledge is obsolete almost the instant it is acquired.
Therefore, the only thing worth learning for Rogers is the process of learning itself;
learning to solve problems, mastering the art of reasoning and sharpening one’s ability
to learn. Furthermore, Rogers posited that the methods of positivism constitute an evil
that stands the way of human actualization. Instead, all human sciences should be
approached phenomenologically, as sciences of understanding rather than prediction.
In this impossibly ephemeral knowledge-world, how are learners to know what to
learn? They know organismically what they want to learn, and should, therefore, let
this ‘organism’ guide them towards knowledge that is relevant to them as a learner at
that moment. And thus, the seeds of SDL were sown.
Impact of Rogers’ theory of self on our relation to the world
The final assumption of importance for understanding SDL is Rogers’ view on indivi-
duals’ relation to the world around them. If individuals are separated by their phenom-
enal bubbles of experience, then how does one relate to others? For Rogers, our
emotions are the tie that binds us. He does not place value on the notion of
a collective other, a ‘society’ greater than the sum of its parts, and instead understands
the social world as a series of interpersonal emotional relationships. Since individuals
cannot experience anything other than their own phenomenal field, the best they can do
to let others understand their reality is to communicate their experience in the most
real way possible, as it happens in the moment, thereby generating a ‘social’ bond that is
defined as a point of contact between internal states moving outward in the World. To
build this social bond, individuals need to feel that their concept of Self will not be
challenged by others – threats and challenges cause people to close themselves to their
organism and to others – instead, self-actualization requires an environment of psy-
chological safety. Transposing this to education, if the learners were to open themselves
up to learning then the learning environment should be as free of threats to the Self as
the therapist’s room. The classroom should be a haven where students and teachers can
meet as ‘real’ people.
Breaking down Rogers’ self-directed learning
In humanist theory, the learner alone knows what is important for them to learn, since
one person’s reality is incommensurable with another’s. The consequence is that the
only valid form of education is self-directed learning: learning guided by the person’s
organismic valuing of his own interests and desires. What if those interests are
destructive or nihilistic? For Rogers, this is not possible because the true Self is naturally
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good and therefore all students once set free are driven to learn, discover, and create
and should be treated as such. Thus, teachers can only serve as the facilitators of the
student’s process of self-discovery – to do this, they must have an open and trusting
relationship with their students based on positive regard in a classroom that exudes
psychological safety. In this utopian place of learning, the teacher hardly teaches; SDL is
a process that is entirely student-guided, where a teacher’s advice is merely one signal in
the flow of the students’ experiences, which they may abide by or ignore mandated by
their quest for actualization. Self-directed in its most extreme sense, Rogerian education
resembles more a therapy session for educated adults than a classroom. His idea for
resolving all educational problems, as proposed in the final chapter of Freedom to
Learn, is to get representatives of all interest groups involved in education to form an
‘encounter’ group and talk about their feelings on the education programme openly as
‘real’ people. In between these groups, learning would happen at the behest of the
students and their natural drive for learning that would push them to seek out knowl-
edge. Rogers’ vision for education is so unabashedly idealistic and so riddled with
assumptions about Self, Knowledge and the World that is it hardly surprising that his
viewpoint should come under close scrutiny and critique.
Developments in self-directed learning theory
Given its emancipatory promise, it is hardly surprising that the humanist conception of the
Self and its educational corollary sparked considerable interest after its publication –
especially in the peculiar context of the late 1960s and early 1970s where a general
discontentment with behaviourist psychology on the one hand, and authoritarian forms
of education on the other, created a fertile field to sow the seeds of a new educational
paradigm. Almost immediately, educationists began to think of ways to implement SDL
and gather concrete, quantified data on its success. The pioneers who implemented SDL in
its early days were Houle (1961), Tough (1971) and Knowles (1975), all working originally
from the humanist paradigm, but quickly moved to specific, data-driven research rather
than Rogers’ conceptual work. From there or, the ontological and epistemological assump-
tions of SDL were put on the back-burner. Tough developed a metric for ‘measuring’ the
readiness of adult learners for self-directed learning fromwhich sprouted a whole branch of
research coalescing around the concept of adult learning. By the 1980s, dozens of empirical
studies of SDL had been conducted, and the first critiques started to appear (Brockett, 1985;
Brookfield, 1984) Those critiques were mostly of a methodological nature but did speak to
some of the original flaws of the theory: that the research primarily focused on white,
middle-class subjects; that the research focused almost exclusively on individual learners at
the expense of the social and political context of learning, and that marginal voices which
could be heard through qualitative research were being silenced by an overemphasis on
metrics and quantitative data. But with the exception of Geller (1982), there was no
systematic attempt to critique Rogers’ ontological premise for SDL. In fact, Rogers was
almost never mentioned anymore after Knowles.
By the end of the 1980s, two philosophical positions appeared to crystallise around
SDL: the first, comprising people like Brookfield and Mezirow, in the ‘humanist or
existentialist’ tradition, the other, a ‘liberal progressive’ strand initiated by Houle
(Caffarella & O’Donnell, 1987). While the former were interested in learning as changes
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in consciousness, the latter was interested in learning within the context of one’s life
span. Neither strand questioned the ontological premises of SDL. Owen (2002) refined
the classification by proposing four categories instead: alongside the majority of SDL
scholars in the humanist tradition, into which liberal progressivism is subsumed, he
proposed neo-behaviourism from a human resources perspective, critical studies, and
constructivism. We do not consider the neo-behaviourism described by Owen to be
rightly in the spirit of SDL; that is, its conditioning-based approach is merely a form of
training which explicitly lacks emancipatory ambition. Owen builds the Constructivist
category around the work of Candy (1991), whose writings seem to move the individual
even further into a phenomenal bubble: a world of idiosyncratically constructed mean-
ings that further reinforce the individualistic premise of SDL. We feel the need to dwell
on the ‘branch’ of critical pedagogy: Owen cites Paulo Freire as the primary author in
the critical school of studies of self-directed learning. He does so likely because of
a book written by Rogers in 1977 in which the latter compared himself with Freire and
considered their philosophies to be almost identical (Rogers, 1977). We agree with
O’Hara’s assessment that there is much more that divides Rogers and Freire than
Rogers claimed, though we disagree with her that these differences can be overlooked
in favour of their similitudes (O’Hara, 1989). But we wish to go further and argue that
Freire’s views are so ontologically opposed to those of Rogers that Freire’s philosophy
cannot be considered self-directed learning and calls for the appellation of Social
Transformative Education. The debate was left hanging in the literature as interest in
these ontological questions waned and the research on SDL in the twenty-first century
became more pedagogy-specific, in particular, associated with problem-based learning
(Blumberg, 2000; Loyens, Magda, & Rikers, 2008).
We will, therefore, reopen the debate and then call on the work of Lev Vygotsky to
lay the ontological foundations of Social Transformative Education in a more systema-
tic manner in the next part of this paper.
Against Rogers – from self-directed learning to social transformative education
We shall propose a re-interpretation of the Self through two complementary dialectic
theories: Freire’s Dialogical Theory of Action and Vygotsky’s Cultural-Historical
Psychology. From this, we shall conclude on the need to replace the discourse of self-
directed learning with the emphasis on a social transformative focus for higher
education.
Freire’s dialogical theory of action
Freire was a Brazilian educator famous for his searing critique of the capitalist system
and its consequences for education, the solution to which could only be found in the
freeing expression of human agency. Freire, best known for his Pedagogy of the
Oppressed (1968/2000), is considered by some the ‘seminal architect of introducing
critical theory into contemporary pedagogical discourse’ (Dale & Hyslop-Margison,
2010).
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Contrasting the humanism of Rogers and Freire
We agree with O’Hara (1989) that Rogers and Freire shared a commitment to education
as a vehicle for liberation, as well as the view that freedom must come from individual
engagement rather than as a gift from the outside. Freire’s notion of ‘human comple-
tion’ is on the surface not too different from Rogers’ fully functioning person. At several
points in the Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire refers to his cause as ‘humanist’ (Freire,
1968/2000, pp. 75, 78, 86), calling for educators to trust in the progressive nature of
Man. The result of this view, for both Rogers and Freire, was a stark criticism of
traditional modes of education. Both thinkers argued that the imposition of content
from teachers onto students alienated the student from his own experience and emptied
education of meaning.
However, the similarities noted above should not induce the reader into thinking
that the two perspectives were aligned. Borrowing inspiration from different branches
of existentialism, Freire and Rogers’ thinking differed considerably from an ontological
perspective. For Freire, the main source of ontological inspiration was not Kierkegaard
but Sartre, particularly his ideas on agency (Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). Sartre’s
existentialism turned to political action when he realised that social life was rife with
structural incentives for people to act in ‘bad faith’, thus barring the way to authenticity
(Golomb, 1995). Therefore, for Sartre, the priority shifted from the achievement of
authenticity to a call for political action that would create the social conditions under
which authenticity could be achieved. Sartre became concerned with the fate of humans
and their freedom in society rather than the human as a singular, isolated being faced
only with itself. His political stance paved the way for the Marxist-existentialist recon-
ciliation that formed the backbone of Freire’s philosophy of education. By contrast,
Rogers saw no structural cause for inaction, merely an interrelational one that could be
fixed by embracing one’s real Self within the psychologically safe space of the group
encounter.
Freire’s dialectical self
Freire believed that structural conditions of oppression stood in the way of human
liberation. He drew inspiration from a Marxist reading of the traverses of capitalism for
his theory of learning; particularly the idea of a dialectic struggle between oppressors
and oppressed. Freire saw in ‘banking education’ the imposition of the patterns of
thinking of the oppressors onto the oppressed in the classroom, thus alienating them
from their own experience as human beings. He accused the language of the oppressors
in literacy and numeracy education of silencing the oppressed. However, contra Marx,
Freire did not believe that History was determined to end in a particular way – the
dialectic did not have as a necessary conclusion the overthrow of the oppressive system.
Instead, sharing Sartre’s belief in human agency, Freire posited that liberation was to be
a continuing struggle. Siding with the oppressed in this battle, his call to action went
through dialogical education: teachers and students working together to unveil reality,
critically re-appraising knowledge. In Freire’s worldview, there is an objective reality, its
true nature hidden by the oppressing elites who do not wish to see it transformed. By
filling students’ heads with elite ideology, the oppressors deprive students of their
creative power to transform the world.
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In Freire’s Dialogical Theory of Action, the Self is not an inward-looking entity
trapped in an idiosyncratic bubble in which others are merely mirrors. Freire spoke
against this sort of subjectivism and stated instead:
The dialogical I however, knows that it is precisely the thou (“not-I”) which has called forth his
or her own existence. He (sic) also knows that the thou which calls forth his own existence in
turn constitutes an I which has in its I a thou. The I and the thou thus become, in the dialectic
of these relationships, two thous which become two I’s (Freire, 1968/2000, p. 165).
In other words, it is in the process of dialogue that the Self emerges as the conjoined
effort of two beings that become fully human in their joint action. The dialogue here is
not meant in the sense intended by Rogers, as an expression of experiential feelings
through which the ‘real Self’ can emerge, but in the sense of a dialectic with its thesis,
antithesis and synthesis, which necessarily calls for action. The ‘action’ component of
Freire’s theory is as important as the dialogical aspect – it is neither sufficient that men
should only reflect on their circumstances, nor is it desirable that they should act
without reflection. This relationship between reflection and action Freire called praxis;
this process was expressed in people’s collective ability to name the world:
To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn
reappears to the namers as a problem and requires of them a new naming. (…) Dialogue is
the encounter between men (sic), mediated by the world, in order to name the world
(Freire, 1968/2000, p. 86).
In opposition to Rogers’ idea that the Self must adjust to its idiosyncratic experiential
world in order to actualize, Freire restored education’s power to transform by giving
students and teachers the capability to unveil reality through words. Learning in Freire’s
world was still self-directed in the sense that only individuals could move themselves
into action, but this Self does not exist in isolation and cannot succeed in transforming
the World without the synergistic relationship it has with other Selves. What might be
the subject and method of such an education? Freire suggested the following:
Those truly committed to liberation must (…) abandon the educational goal of deposit-
making and replace it with the posing of problems of human beings in their relations with
the world. “Problem-posing” education, responding to the essence of consciousness – inten-
tionality – rejects communiqués and embodies communication. (Freire, 1968/2000, p. 79).
Thus, we come to define ‘problem-posing education’ as ‘social-transformative’ in the
sense that it literally calls for students and teachers to collectively transform the World.
But to leave our argument at that would not make significant inroads into the
ontological and epistemological debate surrounding SDL and critical pedagogy: one
could simply agree to disagree about the degree of similarity or difference between
Rogers and Freire, which appears to have been the position held by O’Hara (1989).
Instead, we will attempt to strengthen the case that the ontological defects of the
humanist approach and the educational needs of our era call for moving beyond self-
directed learning by using the works of Vygotsky whom we consider to have explained
the social nature of being and knowing with the greatest scientific rigour.
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Vygotsky’s cultural history approach to learning
Just after the Bolshevik revolution, Vygotsky founded a school of thought known as
Cultural-Historical Psychology, which succeeded in producing a rich theoretical and
empirical legacy that survived Stalinism (Slunecko & Wieser, 2014). Vygotsky’s interest
was first in the development of speech and thinking, and later on the more general
relationship between human activity (of which speech is a special kind) and thought
(Stetsenko, 2005). His take on the Self and Knowledge are less well understood than his
ideas on pedagogy but are nonetheless crucial to our understanding of social-
transformative education.
Contrasting Rogers’ and Vygotsky’s self
Sitting at opposite poles from Rogers, Vygotsky posited that all human activity was
woven into a web of social, cultural and historical artefacts that it cannot escape. Thus,
from a Cultural History perspective, it would make little sense to speak of peeling back
the layers of social interference with the Self to return to organismic valuing since the
Self is social, woven into an interpsychological (social) plane. Whatever develops within
the intrapsychological (personal) plane cannot be understood without the social, his-
torical and cultural context of the interpsychological plane from whence it formed in
the early years of the person’s life (Wertsch, 1979).
Vygotsky’s concept of the Self serves communication while Rogers’ concept of the
Self is served by communication. The former posits the primacy of social communica-
tion over the Self while the latter sees the Self as the primary entity receiving inputs
from communication into its phenomenal field. In other words, the social precedes the
individual in Vygotsky’s worldview: ‘In our conception, the true direction of the
development of thinking is not from the individual to the social but from the social
to the individual’ (1987, p. 36).
Like Freire, Vygotsky believed in a dialectic relationship between the Self and society
which afforded individuals the power to transform the very social environment that was
shaping them through the power of signs, among which speech held a privileged position.
As argued by Anh and Marginson (2013, p. 148): ‘mediation by signs both responds to and
creates historical conditions’. The empowering nature of dialectics was missed in Geller’s
critique of Rogers that painted the individual as entirely subjected to social forces (Geller,
1982). Vygotsky’s dialectics preserved the emancipatory power of being and knowing.
Speech, learning and social-transformative education
To explain the primacy of the social over the phenomenal, Vygotsky posited that speech
was the moulding tool of the mind; and being issued from the interpsychological plane,
the product of a historical and cultural context rather than a biological given or an
individual construction. Its foremost purpose in early childhood is social, and only later
does it become a tool to express inner thoughts (Berk & Winsler, 1995; Wertsch, 1979).
Because higher mental functions develop out of the internalization of speech, which is
socially constructed, Rogers’ ‘organismic’ valuing process is nonsensical from
a Vygotskian perspective.
The reversal of the individual and the social from Rogers to Vygotsky has important
consequences: if the Self is a construction issued from social processes, then it would
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follow that learning itself must be embedded in the social world, and therefore cannot
be the idiosyncratic activity imagined by Rogers; instead of being self-directed, learning
must be socially driven. Vygotsky explained this through the Zone of Proximal
Development (ZPD), a catch-all phrase describing the things that a student is capable
of learning with assistance, given his prior knowledge and experience (Vygotsky, 1987,
p. 209). As such, students should be guided by more knowledgeable peers that can help
them structure the knowledge in their mind and allow them to advance into the ZPD.
Vygotsky demonstrated through empirical experiments that spontaneous concepts
arising in children’s minds from everyday experience in a bottom-up fashion were
much richer experientially than scientific concepts, but children struggled to extract
themselves from the grounded nature of their experience and produce generalizations
and abstractions. Without the systematizing influence of instruction, students would be
incapable of making sense of the knowledge they acquired. This finding does not mean
that Vygotsky was advocating for top-down instruction or absolving the Self from any
responsibility in education. On the contrary, he saw learning as the ‘the unique form of
cooperation between the child and the adult’ (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 169). This theory was
applied to adult learning during the cognitive psychology revolution in the 1960s.
In this cooperative process, students need to internalize the signs of speech that the
more knowledgeable other uses to guide them in their task. The learning process is still
self-directed in the sense that the process of internalization can only be done by the
student – knowledge cannot be ‘transferred’ – but goes beyond SDL, to a self-drive to
learn within a social environment structured by speech and interactions on the inter-
psychological plane.
Now we can draw the relationship between Freire’s concept of ‘naming the World’
and Vygotsky’s theory of speech: Freire’s social transformative concept of education
could be interpreted as the possibility for students and teachers to dialectically restruc-
ture the linguistic artefacts that mediate learning. Freire’s dialectic encounter between
students and teachers allows the possibility for students to re-appropriate what Wertsch
(1979) called ‘language-games’ (language in the context of human activity) in order to
socially construct meanings around their collective reality. Not only can this be done
within the student-to-teacher relationship, but also within entire communities. Social-
transformative education then means the possibility of changing the structure of the
social group’s relationship to itself and to the World by dialectically developing the
signs needed to understand, then reshape social reality – a possibility afforded by
Vygotsky’s cultural-history approach but not afforded by Rogers’ humanistic approach.
We call this ‘education’ rather than ‘learning’ to highlight the point that the impact goes
beyond mere changes to long-term memory in students; the very constituent parts of
the Self, in its totality, face the possibility for transformation.
From self-directed learning to social-transformative education
It is one thing to have a conceptual discussion critiquing the ontological premises of SDL
and quite another to consider the implications of this critique for higher education. And
yet our paper began by noting that the aspiration for SDL is everywhere in the vocabulary
of higher education, calling upon institutions and teachers alike to espouse the individua-
listic conceptions of students and their learning process within their teaching practices.
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We believe that the prevalence of the aspiration for SDL in higher education conveniently
coincides with the shift from education as a public good to a private good, with higher
education as a responsibility of the State towards society to higher education as the
responsibility of individuals towards private corporations, a position also held by other
authors (Collini, 2012; Dale & Hyslop-Margison, 2010). We would argue that placing the
responsibility for the learning process on the shoulders of individuals has certain advan-
tages for cash-strapped universities: it allows them to redirect their content experts
towards research, upon which university rankings depend (which in turn affects student
numbers and therefore revenue from tuition fees) and leave the teaching to graduate
students armed with standardized packages of (online) resources for their students to use.
Leaving aside, for now, the unfair disadvantage that this confers students whose socio-
economic background does not provide them with the sort of prior knowledge and
experience that foster effective self-education in an academic setting, this approach to
higher education pits students as individuals competing for excellence in a zero-sum game
job market. In this setting, even small-group active learning can be framed as an inter-
personal exercise benefiting individual students’ ‘collaborative skills’ or ‘interpersonal
skills’ and other valuable curriculum vitae additions in a competitive market environment.
According to Rogers’ theory, SDL should have emancipated young people from the
tyranny of professorial authority, made them into self-actualised adults living up to
their full potential. Yet contrarily to what Rogers believed, the average student left alone
will not encounter his ‘real self’ in some idealistic quest for knowledge that responds to
his organismic needs. Kirschner, Sweller and Clark argued based on recent cognitive
psychology findings that minimally guided instruction leads to an overload of working
memory (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006), a conclusion rather at odds with Rogers’
suppositions. Beyond issues of memory load, it is our experience that when the
epistemological positions of the various disciplines are presented to a student out of
context, they tend to feel a deep state of disconcert that they alleviate by clinging to
standardized yet shallow measures of achievement such as grades. The monopoly of
top-down standardized testing reinforces disempowerment (Leach, Neutze, & Zepke,
2010), even in curricula that claim to use SDL (Savin-Baden, 2004). In a world of higher
education rife with aspirations to SDL, we see that young people, particularly in the
West where such aspirations are the most prominent, feel politically disengaged
(Pontes, Henn, & Griffiths, 2017), unhappy, stressed, worried about their job prospects
(Winerman, 2017), while efforts to tackle urgent global challenges such as climate
change and financial instability are stalling under the weight of isolationist, authoritar-
ian tendencies in global politics. We submit that it is time for higher education to step
away from the unfulfilled emancipatory promises of self-directed learning, and start
engaging students in social transformative education. In the final section of this paper,
we consider how this might play out with real students in real classrooms.
Engaging students dialectically with pressing social challenges
Social transformative education asks for a different positioning of students, teachers and
societal partners such that one does not dominate or impose upon the other, but that
they jointly learn about and change the conditions of society. Concretely, we advocate
the use of problem-oriented, interdisciplinary, participant-directed education, most
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often organised in the form of learning projects. Such a methodology can be traced back
to Freire’s call for problem-posing education and the specific methodology for
Participatory Action Research that he developed in Chapter 3 of the Pedagogy of the
Oppressed (Freire, 1968/2000), but has been most thoroughly developed, implemented
and researched in a higher education setting by the Danish reformed university of
Roskilde (Andersen & Heilesen, 2014; Pedersen, 2008). Within this setting, the twin
concepts of commitment and interdependency are crucial. Commitment implies that
students are encouraged to address topics situated within their social context, thereby
eschewing the academic ivory tower. In doing so, it is hoped that students will come to
understand education not merely as a tool for personal development in the context of
labour market skills, but primarily as the vehicle through which the societies of
tomorrow are imagined. Such an imagining requires the transcendence of disciplinary
imperatives, which can only be successfully achieved through problem-oriented educa-
tion. The concept of interdependency accounts for the fact that social histories are
constructed on the interpsychogical plane. The individual learning alone is powerless to
challenge the weight of the dominant culture and history as congealed in speech, but
through the collective experience of project work, removed from professorial authority
but guided by a facilitator, students and the social partners in their projects can come to
grips with their own power to reshape meaning. As a group students will propose
a social challenge they want to address. As a group, including teachers and societal
partners, they will formulate their research problem in a way that challenges their
student-centric view and opens up their minds to alternative perspectives. Within this
educational setting, all parties participate as researchers – Freire called this the colla-
boration between the teacher-students and the student-teachers. Together they look
into the social challenges and redefine the challenges as well as their solutions. This
form of education is not only about ‘what is’, with all the subjectivity that this implies,
but also about ‘what could be’, squarely opposed to the false neutrality of the ‘banking’
mode of education imposed from the teacher to the individual student. As the project
goes on, students come to realize the possibilities and limits of their own knowledge
as well as the possibilities and limits of the knowledge the other partners bring in. This
where dialectics come in: the knowledge of one party is always positioned with regards
to the knowledge other partners to the table, mediated through speech and symbols.
From thereon existing knowledge can be combined beyond disciplines, challenged in its
premises and meaning, and recreated and reframed until the whole group with all of its
diverse parties agrees that they have addressed the collective problem. The resulting
‘project report’ is the drafted both for the purposed of collectively evaluating the
students, and assisting the social partners in transforming their practices (sometimes
two separate reports are drafted – one for an academic audience and the other for the
social partners). Despite (perhaps because of?) the potential of problem-oriented project
work for addressing social challenges, the implementation of such a pedagogical
approach is quite often resisted by education managers, ministries of education and
many teachers until either the approach is watered down such that the projects are no
longer problem-oriented or dropped altogether (see the case of Roskilde: Hansen,
1997).
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Qualified teachers as the lynchpin of social transformation
The use of problem-oriented project work might seem to neutralise the role of the
teacher, as per the recommendations of Rogers. But rather, such an educational setting
bestows upon the teacher a very special role – namely that of suggesting confronting
ideas that force the students to consider new information in a holistic, interdisciplinary
manner. This sort of input from the teacher was called ‘hinge-thematics’ by Freire,
referring to the fact that the teacher’s input helps to articulate the student’s worldview
into a broader picture. However, Freire was not specific as to what exactly the teacher
should be expected to do – Vygotsky’s education approach is a lot more enlightening in
this regard. The fact that speech is issued from the interpsychological plane means that
students need assistance from more knowledgeable peers in order to process, and then
challenge the meanings associated with the symbols presented to them in the educa-
tional setting. Without this help, they may simply be unable to let go of their pre-
conceptions and certainties and will struggle to deconstruct their ideas through
thematic dialogue. Thus, adding to what Freire suggested, a cultural-historical approach
call upon teachers to tie new information, theories and practices into their historical
context. The ability to confront students dialectically through hinge-thematics, to
critically deconstruct and reconstruct historical narratives, to mediate thematic dialogue
takes time and experience to acquire, and can only be nurtured if teachers are valued
for the role that they play.
Situating emancipation socially
The appeal of SDL was in its emancipatory promise. We have shown that such
a promise cannot be fulfilled by this approach, and have proposed social transformative
education instead. We have suggested the potential impact of social transformative
education on social challenges, but what of its emancipatory potential for students? At
the end of the day, emancipation is not a purely collective event and must also imply
autonomy of the individual. While offering emancipation without challenging the
structural impediments to such does not work, neither does challenging structural
issues without recognizing individual personhood. Personhood in social transformative
education is recognised, valued and expressed in its contribution and participation to
what ‘could be’. The small-group education setting offers the challenge of differing
viewpoints that must converge towards collective solutions without suffocating person-
hood in a collective and uniform mass. At the small group level, facilitated by
a competent teacher, students are challenged to become intellectually free within the
socially and politically bound context that we all, as human, need to learn to navigate.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have challenged the emancipatory claims of self-directed learning,
suggesting instead higher education can only become empowering for students, teachers
and communities if it seeks to be social-transformative. Providing a philosophical frame-
work around self-directed learning through an analysis of the work of Carl Rogers and the
literature on self-directed learning has allowed us to understand why the concept is flawed
from foundations onwards. Taking up the debate pitting Rogers against Freire in the
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literature, we have complemented this with Vygotsky’s take on the role of language in
historical, cultural and social narratives. This has given us an avenue for exploring the
potential of dialectic approaches to education through problem-oriented, project-based
work. Although it is important to recognise the historical contribution of self-directed
learning in challenging authoritarian modes of education, and to value some of the tools
that it has produced (such as the student-teacher contract and the metrics by which to assess
self-direction) the purpose of this paper was to issue a call to move away from self-directed
learning, towards social-transformative education. We hope this has been achieved, but
much now needs to be done to conceptually and empirically ground this into praxis.
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